The Effect of Local Holdings on Audit Policy and Outcomes by BAIK, BOK
Seoul Journal of Business
Volume 17, Number 2 (December 2011)
The Effect of Local Holdings on Audit Policy and 
Outcomes*




This paper examines whether local block holdings are associated with 
audit policy and outcomes. For local investors are long-term investors and 
they tend to invest a larger portion of their total investment in local com-
panies, I posit that local block holders will be dedicated investors and have 
strong incentives to monitor management. Consistently I find that compa-
nies with local block holders are less likely to have unclean/going-concern 
opinions, and more likely to have long-term relationships with auditors. 
In addition, although I find weak evidence that the existence of local block 
investors affects audit fees, I do not observe any significant difference of 
audit fees between firms with local block holdings and firms with nonlocal 
block holdings. Overall, this paper shows that information advantage of 
local investors can have real effects on audit process through monitoring 
activities. 
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INTRODUCTION
Using an extensive dataset on institutional block holdings by 
geographically proximate investors (i.e., local institutional block 
holdings), I examine whether firms’ audit policy and outcomes (i.e., 
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audit fees, audit opinions, and auditor selection) systematically dif-
fer in the presence of local institutional block holders relative to 
firms with nonlocal institutional block holders and with no block 
holders.1) These variables are often used to proxy audit quality 
(Francis 2004). 
Firms engage auditors to monitor firm activity related to material 
misstatements in financial statements and the going-concern na-
ture of the firm.2) Prior studies suggest that block holders also have 
incentives to act as monitors of a broad set of firm activities, and I 
expect the audit policy and audit outcomes of the firm to be within 
the realm of the block holder’s interests and influence. Recent evi-
dence also suggests that information and cost advantages due to 
the geographic proximity of the block holder (local versus nonlocal) 
to the firm’s headquarters may enable some block holders to better 
perform this monitoring function. Also, local investors tend to hold 
their holdings for longer periods than nonlocal investors (Kang and 
Kim 2008). Previous studies use institutional investors’ stock trad-
ing style, such as portfolio turnover and diversification, as proxies 
for information advantages and show that certain types of institu-
tional investors have consistent information advantages over other 
types of institutional investors (Bushee 1998; Ke and Petroni 2004). 
However, the approaches used in these papers to classify institu-
tional investors into informed and uninformed investors are unclear 
in explaining the sources of information advantages that institution-
al investors have. Furthermore, their classifications of institutional 
investors themselves may simply identify some firm characteristics 
related to future stock returns. My classification attributes geo-
graphic proximity to be a major source of informational advantage 
for monitoring and thus is less likely to be subject to an endogeneity 
problem.3) Using geographic proximity, I identify local block investors 
and investigate whether the likelihood of qualified audit opinions 
including going concern opinions, the likelihood of auditor changes, 
  1) I use the term audit policy to refer to auditor selection and payment decisions. 
Audit outcome represents the result of the audit process (i.e., an unqualified or 
qualified audit opinion).
  2) With respect to fraud detection, SAS No. 99 requires that the auditors (1) gather 
information needed to identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud, (2) as-
sess these risks after taking into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs 
and controls and (3) respond to the results.
  3) Gaspar and Massa (2007) and Kang and Kim (2007) document evidence on the 
exogeneity of local ownership. 
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and the level of audit fees differ systematically across firms with 
local institutional block holders, firms with nonlocal institutional 
block holders, and firms with no block holders.
Unlike small shareholders who free-ride corporate governance ac-
tivities of other shareholders (Grossman and Hart 1980), block hold-
ers have strong incentives to monitor managerial performance and 
take actions that enhance firm value (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
For example, prior studies document that outside block holders play 
an important role regarding executive compensation policy (Mehran 
1995; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000) and top executive turn-
over (Denis et al. 1997; Bethel et al. 1998; Kaplan and Minton 1994; 
Kang and Shivdasani 1995). Evidence also suggests that takeover 
activity is affected by the presence of external block holders (Mik-
kelson and Partch 1989; Shivdasani 1993). Further evidence of the 
monitoring role of block holders is found in Dechow et al. (1996), 
who find that firms manipulating their earnings are less likely to 
have an external block holder.
More recent evidence suggests that local block holders, those 
geographically closer to investee headquarters, have certain advan-
tages over nonlocal block holders that may enhance their ability to 
act as firm monitors. Several studies find evidence consistent with 
geographically proximate investors and analysts having an informa-
tional advantage, as evidenced by higher average returns (Baik et 
al. 2010; Coval and Moskowitz 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005) 
and more accurate earnings forecasts (Malloy 2005). Additionally, 
closer proximity is expected to reduce monitoring costs for local 
relative to nonlocal block holders. Sussman and Zeira (1995) model 
bank monitoring costs as an increasing function of distance. Kedia 
and Rajgopal (2011) find that firms located near an SEC office are 
less likely to misreport financial information, consistent with firms 
assessing the probability of SEC oversight as a function of moni-
toring costs associated with distance. The enhanced ability of local 
block holders to act as monitors is evident in Kang and Kim (2008), 
who show that, relative to remote block holders, local block holders 
are more likely to engage in post-acquisition governance activities in 
targets, and that targets with local block holders experience higher 
abnormal announcement returns and better post-acquisition oper-
ating performance. 
Given their incentives and abilities to monitor firm activities and 
influence corporate policy, I expect firms with block holders to be 
100 Seoul Journal of Business
more likely to select a higher quality auditor relative to firms with no 
block holders.4) In particular, I expect that increased oversight and 
ability to affect policy that enhances firm value by block holders, 
especially by local block holders, will also be evident in the audit 
outcomes of the firm; I expect a lower likelihood of qualified audit 
opinions, including going concern opinions. Results confirm a lower 
likelihood of qualified audit opinions, including a lower likelihood of 
a going concern opinion, for firms with local block holders relative to 
firms with nonlocal block holders and firms with no block holders. 
Increased oversight of managerial activities and ability to influence 
corporate policy are also expected to decrease factors, such as earn-
ings management, that may contribute to auditor turnover (Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney 1996). Given evidence in prior studies suggest-
ing enhanced opportunities to independently monitor managerial 
activities, I expect lower auditor turnover for local block holder firms 
in particular. Results confirm this expectation. I find a lower likeli-
hood of auditor change for firms with local block holders relative to 
firms with nonlocal block holders and firms with no block holders. 
Similarly, I also expect that the independent monitoring func-
tion of the local block holder moderates the importance of the audi-
tor as a monitor. That is, local block holders will demand a higher 
quality audit as evidenced by higher audit fees (after controlling for 
the effect of auditor quality on audit fees) than non block holders. 
Interestingly, I find strong evidence that firms with nonlocal block 
holders pay higher audit fees, and weaker evidence (p-value = 0.10) 
that local block holder firms also pay higher audit fees relative to 
firms with no block holders, consistent with block holders influenc-
ing the demand for higher quality audits. 
In summary, my evidence suggests clear differences in audit 
policy and audit outcomes for firms with local block holders relative 
to firms with nonlocal block holder and firms with no block hold-
ers. My results are consistent with the monitoring story by local 
block holders. In other words, local block holders with enhanced 
informational advantages can independently monitor firm activities 
  4) However, differences in auditor quality between local and nonlocal block holder 
firms may not be clear since geographic proximity for local block holders increas-
es their ability to influence selection of a higher quality auditor while at the same 
time increasing their information advantages to independently monitor firm ac-
tivity, potentially decreasing the importance of auditor quality relative to nonlocal 
block holders.
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moderating the importance of auditor and audit quality relative to 
nonlocal block holder firms. Local block holder advantages to more 
closely monitor management and influence corporate policy also ap-
pear to enhance auditor stability, the auditor’s opinion of the repre-
sentational faithfulness of the firm’s financial statements, and the 
auditor’s opinion on the going concern nature of the firm relative to 
firms with nonlocal and no block holders.
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. To my best 
knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of local 
block holding ownership on audit policy and outcomes. Thus, my 
study adds new findings to the literature on the relation between 
monitoring mechanisms and audit attributes (Carcello et al. 2002). 
My results suggest that local block holders play an important 
monitoring role (Ayers et al. 2011) and in turn improve audit quality. 
My paper is also related to the extant research that examines the 
determinants and the economic consequences of audit quality 
(Choi and Kwon 2008; Choi et al. 2008; Francis, 2004). I extend the 
literature by providing new evidence that local investors influence 
audit quality. Second, previous accounting literature (Bushee 1998; 
Ke and Ketroni 2004) has focused on whether certain types of 
investors, such as transitory investors, have information advantages 
over other investors and whether such information advantages affect 
their investment decisions. However, it is not well known whether 
information asymmetry has real effects on audit procedures. This 
paper can show that the information advantage of investors can 
have real effects on audit process through monitoring of informed 
investors. Finally, I add to the literature on the effect of geographic 
proximity on portfolio performance and analyst performance, by 
providing evidence on the role of local investors in determining audit 
quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
literature review and my research questions. Section 3 describes the 
data and research design. Section 4 provides empirical evidence and 
Section 5 concludes. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Local investors
Recent studies document that geography plays an important role 
in financial economics. For example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) 
analyze the role of geographic proximity in the context of U.S. mu-
tual fund managers and show that U.S. fund managers exhibit a 
bias toward locally headquartered firms, particularly with small, 
highly leveraged firms that produce nontraded goods. Coval and 
Moskowitz (2001) also show that on average fund managers gener-
ate an additional return of 2.65 percent per year from their local in-
vestments compared to their nonlocal investments. They argue that 
fund managers earn such abnormal returns in their local holdings 
as compensation for information they acquire about local compa-
nies. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) examine the stock investments 
of U.S. households and show that individual investors exhibit a local 
bias to an even larger degree than professional money managers do. 
They also find that the average household generates an additional 
return of 3.7 percent per year from its local holdings relative to its 
nonlocal holdings. Moreover, Malloy (2005) shows that geographi-
cally proximate analysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts, 
update their forecasts more frequently and impact stock prices more 
than nonlocal analysts. In the context of acquisitions, Kedia et al. 
(2008) show that acquirers have a strong preference for local firms. 
They also show that bidder returns in local transactions are higher 
than those in nonlocal transactions.
Therefore, these findings suggest that investors can access to 
information more easily for local firms than nonlocal firms, which 
translates into better investment performance. Specifically, local 
investors could acquire information about the firm with lower costs 
than nonlocal investors. Geographically proximate investors may 
use less time and face lower costs associated with traveling and 
searching for information about a particular firm. They may follow 
the firm through local media reports. Furthermore, investors may 
have informal sources of information about local companies, such as 
conversations with employees, managers, suppliers of the firm, and 
customers. In particular, large shareholders, such as block holders, 
located near the firm can visit the firm and meet CEOs face-to-face 
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more often to obtain information.5) 
In addition to their informational advantages, geographically prox-
imate investors may have advantages in terms of monitoring costs 
over distant investors. Monitoring of management involves substan-
tial costs to investors and such monitoring costs may be related to 
the distance between investors and the firm. Monitoring costs tend 
to increase with the distance from the firm because of extra com-
munication costs or transportation costs incurred by investors. For 
example, Sussman and Zeira (1995) present a model in which banks 
face monitoring costs that increase in distance. Empirically, Peter-
son and Rajan (2002) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) show that 
transportation costs cause price discrimination in bank lending. 
In the context of U.S. venture capital, Lerner (1995) finds that the 
board membership of VCs in private biotechnology firms is partly 
determined by the distance between the firms and the venture capi-
talist.6) Lerner argues that the monitoring costs associated with fre-
quent visits and intensive involvement can be reduced if the venture 
capitalist is located near a company’s headquarters. In addition, Ke-
dia and Rajgopal (2011) show that the distance between firms and 
the SEC office is positively associated with the likelihood of financial 
misreporting, suggesting that firms behave as if they understood 
that the monitoring cost of regulators is an increasing function of 
distance. Choi et al. (2008) show that audit quality and audit pricing 
are influenced by geographic proximity of auditors to clients. 
Furthermore, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) argue that fund man-
agers’ information advantages may be the result of improved moni-
toring capabilities of local firms, which suggests that the governance 
activities of investors may enhance their information advantage.7) 
For instance, shareholders who have their representatives on the 
  5) The sample period covers post regulation fair disclosure years. I acknowledge 
that this is not possible in the post regulation fair disclosure period.
  6) Lerner (1995) shows that venture capital organizations located within five miles 
from a firm’s headquarters are twice as likely to provide board members to the 
firm as those more than 500 miles away. Lerner argues that the transaction costs 
associated with frequent visits and intensive involvement prevent remote venture 
capitalist from actively participating in the governance activity in the firm.
  7) Coval and Moskowitz (2001) suggest that the governance activities of geographi-
cally proximate investors may facilitate their information advantage over remote 
investors: “This information may be the result of improved monitoring capabilities 
or access to private information of geographically proximate firms.” (pp. 812, 838) 
This observation suggests that geographically proximate investors may be better 
monitors than other investors.
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board of directors are expected to have superior access to informa-
tion about the firm. 
In sum, geographically proximate investors may have significant 
advantages in terms of governance activities over remote investors. 
To the extent that local investors face lower transaction costs as-
sociated with their governance activities, they may be more likely 
to monitor managerial performance and pursue active governance 
strategies compared to nonlocal investors. Moreover, the governance 
activities of local investors may be more effective than those of non-
local investors since investors located near the firm can closely mon-
itor management and take governance actions quickly in respond to 
management decisions. Furthermore, such governance activities of 
local investors may have important influence on operating perfor-
mance and firm value. In particular, Kang and Kim (2008) show that 
that local block holders are more likely to engage in post-acquisition 
governance activities in targets than are remote block holders, and 
targets of local block holders experience both higher abnormal an-
nouncement returns and better post-acquisition operating perfor-
mance than do remote targets. 
Block Holders
I focus on block holders since unlike small shareholders who are 
likely to free-ride the corporate governance activities of other share-
holders (Grossman and Hart1980), large shareholders have strong 
incentives to monitor managerial performance and take actions that 
enhance firm value (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). For example, Denis 
et al. (1997), Bethel et al.(1998), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show that outside block holders play an 
important role in the process of top executive turnover. Specifically, 
they find that the probability of top executive turnover is positively 
related to the presence of outside block shareholder. In addition, 
Shivdasani (1993) shows that domestic large outside shareholders 
increase the likelihood that a firm is taken over, while Denis and 
Serrano (1996) shows that, if a takeover is defeated, management 
turnover is higher in poorly performing firms that have domestic 
block holders.
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Audits
A frontier work on auditing by Simunic and Stein (1996) provides 
an economic framework for audit quality. They develop a theoretical 
model that the economic costs of auditing vary with the size, 
complexity, riskiness, and other characteristics of the audited 
firm. Given the importance of monitors’ oversight of the financial 
reporting and audit processes, it is plausible that audit policy and 
outcomes are influenced by monitoring mechanisms such as board 
characteristics and block holders (Beasley 1996; Chung and Lee 
1998; Dechow et al. 1996). Prior research provides some evidence 
on the effect of monitoring mechanism on audit quality. Klein 
(2002), Beasley and Salterio (2001), and DeFond et al.(2002) suggest 
that boards with stronger governance attributes tend to value the 
services of high quality audit. 
In this paper, I relate several audit attributes such as audit 
opinions, audit turnover, and audit pricing to the existence of 
block holdings. Audit opinions and auditor turnover may reflect 
audit quality. For example, DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) 
find that discretionary accruals are income decreasing during 
the last year with the previous auditor and insignificant during 
the subsequent years with the successor. Bradshaw et al. (2001) 
examine the association between accruals and auditor turnover 
and unclean opinions and find no evidence that auditors signal the 
higher likelihood of GAAP violations associated with high accruals 
via audit opinion or auditor changes. DeFond et al. (2002) and 
Reynolds and Francis (2000) also indicate that one of the most 
common measures to infer auditor behavior is to use the propensity 
to issue going concern qualifications. Chen and Church (1996) find 
that the market reaction to a bankruptcy announcement is less 
negative when the auditor has previously issued a going-concern 
report, suggesting that a going-concern report is more of a surprise 
to investors. The extant audit research indicates that audit quality 
is priced in the market (Choi et al. 2008). Carcello et al. (2002) also 
provide evidence that there is a positive relation between audit fees 
and board independence, diligence, and expertise, suggesting that 
the board of directors is likely to review and affect the overall audit 
scope and audit fee.
To the extent that local block holders curve managerial opportunism 
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and play a better monitoring role than nonlocal block holders, I 
expect that companies with local block holders are less likely to 
have unclean/going-concern opinions, more likely to have long-term 
relationships with auditors, and more likely to pay audit fees.
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Data
The initial sample includes all U.S. firm years populated in 
COMPUSTAT for the sample period of 1988-2005. I obtain infor-
mation on institutional ownership from actual forms filed with the 
SEC on a quarterly basis. The SEC requires institutions managing 
more than $100 million in equity to file a quarterly report of equity 
holdings more than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. 
To identify geographically proximate investors, I collect locations of 
institutions’ headquarters from SEC filings, Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Managers, and Moody’s Bank and Finance Manual. I 
define local investors as institutional investors whose headquarters 
are located within the same state as the firms’ head quarters. I 
obtain a firm’s auditors, auditor changes, unclean opinions from 
COMPUSTAT. For the analysis that requires information on going 
concern opinions and audit fees, I collect data from Audit Analytics. 
Due to data availability on Audit Analytics (i.e., the coverage of 
Audit Analytics is from 2000 to 2005), I have less sample size for the 
analysis on going concern opinions and audit fees. Accounting and 
stock return data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.   
Research Design
To test the hypothesis, I estimate the following regression models 
that link audit attributes with the existence of local block holders 
and other control variables: 
P Unclean LocalBlock NonlocalBlock Size( ( )=1) = + +β β β0 21
+ + + + + +β β β β β β3 4 5 6 7 8BTM AR Inv Debt ROA Bigfour   (1)
+ + + + +β β β β ε9 10 11 12Age Pastreturn Beta turnRe var
P Goingconcern LocalBlock NonlocalBlock( ) ( )=1 = +β β0 1
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+ + + + + +β β β β β β2 3 4 5 6 7Size BTM AR Inv Debt ROA   (2)
+ + + +β β β β8 9 10 11Bigfour Age Pastreturn Beta
+ +β ε12 Re varturn
P Auditorchange LocalBlock NonlocalBlock( ) ( )= = +1 0 1β β
+ + + + + +β β β β β β2 3 4 5 6 7Size BTM AR Inv Debt ROA   (3)
+ + + +β β β β8 9 10 11Bigfour Age Pastreturn Beta
+ +β ε12 Re varturn
Log Fees LocalBlock NonlocalBlock Size( ) ( )= + +β β β0 21
+ + + + + +β β β β β β3 4 5 6 7 8BTM AR Inv Debt ROA Bigfour    (4)
+ + + + +β β β β ε9 10 11 12Age Pastreturn Beta turnRe var
where Size is the natural logarithm of market cap, BTM is book-
to-market ratio, AR is accounts receivable deflated by total assets, 
Inv is inventory deflated by total assets, Debt is total debt deflated 
by total assets, ROA is operating income deflated by total assets, 
Bigfour is 1 for big four accounting firms, 0 otherwise, Age is the 
number of months since a firm’s first appearance in COMPUSTAT, 
Past return is the preceding six-month return, Beta is estimated 
from the market model by using days -220 to -20 relative to the 
earnings announcement date, in which  the market return is 
measured as the CRSP value-weighted return. Returnvar is the 
variance of the residual from the same market model. 
Endogenity and self-selection issues may arise if I examine a 
contemporaneous relation between audit attributes and the ex-
istence of local block holdings. While local block holders exert 
monitoring efforts and affect audit quality, it is possible that local 
block holders self-select into those firms with high audit quality. To 
address this potential endogeneity and self-selection issues related 
to local block holding ownership and audit attributes, I utilize 
a lead-lag approach. In other words, I measure my explanatory 
variable and control variables in the year t – 1 and the dependant 
variables in year t. 
The key variable of interest is a dummy variable for the existence 
of local (nonlocal) block holders. I take the value of 1 if there exists 
local (nonlocal) block institutional ownership, 0 otherwise. Local 
(nonlocal) block institutional ownership is 1 if the firm has at least 
5% of block equity holdings by institutional investors whose head-
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The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. The sample 
consists of firm-years with institutional ownership from CDA/Spectrum 
Institutional (13f) Holdings for the period 1988-2005 for which the locations of 
firm and institution headquarters are available. Block institutional ownership 
is 1 if the firm has at least 5% of block institutional ownership, 0 otherwise. 
Local (nonlocal) block institutional ownership is 1 if the firm has at least 5% 
of block equity holdings by institutional investors whose headquarters are 
located within the same (different) state as the firms’ headquarters. Audit 
opinions and auditor fees are obtained from Audit Analytics for the period of 
2000-2005. Auditors and audit opinions are obtained from Compustat Annual. 
Unclean audit opinion is an indicator variable, and is assigned the value of 0 
for an unqualified opinion in year t and the value of 1 for any other opinion, 
including qualified, adverse or unqualified with explanatory language. Book-to-
market and return on assets are winsorized at the 1st and 9.
9th percentiles. To measure beta and variance of the residual from the market 
model, I estimate market model parameters by using days -220 to -20 rela-
tive to the earnings announcement date. I use as the market return the CRSP 
value-weighted return. 
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quarters are located within the same (different) state as the firms’ 
headquarters. The auditing literature provides guidance on the 
control variables (Choi and Dugar 2005; DeFond and Subramanyam 
1998; Francis 2004; Higgs and Skantz 2006). The control variables 
that I use are firm size, book-to-market ratio, accounts receivable, 
inventory, debt, operating income, a big four dummy, age, past six-
month return,  beta, and return volatility.8) Detailed definitions of 
the control variables are summarized in Table 1. I also control for 
year dummy variables and industry dummy variables. For brevity, I 
do not include those variables in the results. 
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables I use in 
the empirical analyses. 28% of the firms are associated with unclean 
audit opinions. Unclean audit opinion is an indicator variable, and 
is assigned the value of 0 for an unqualified opinion in year t and 
the value of 1 for any other opinion, including qualified, adverse 
or unqualified with explanatory language on COMPUSTAT. The 
average going concern opinion dummy is 0.07 and the mean auditor 
turnover dummy is 0.11. The mean (median) audit fees is $1.09 (0.32) 
millions. 
The mean block institutional ownership dummy is 0.62, indicating 
about 62% of my sample firms have a block institutional holder. 
12% of the sample firms have a local block institutional holder 
while 58% of the sample firms show a nonlocal block institutional 
holder. The mean (median) firm size is $1,804 (152.3) billions while 
the book-to-market ratio shows a mean (median) of 0.37 (0.45). 
The mean accounts receivable is 17% of total assets and  inventory 
accounts for 11% of total assets on average. The mean leverage (debt/
  8) I find that firms with both local and nonlocal block holders are more likely to 
use a Big 4 audit firm relative to firms with no block holders. Interestingly, I find 
that nonlocal block holder firms are slightly more likely to select a higher quality 
auditor than local block holder firms. This result suggests that the independent 
monitoring function of the local block holder may substitute to some degree for 
the monitoring function of the auditor, while the remote nonlocal block holders 
rely more on the auditor as monitor.
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total assets) is 0.25. About 83% of the sample hire one of the big 
four firms during the sample period. The average age of the firms 
is 13.4 years and the mean preceding six-month return is 4% while 
the mean beta is 0.75. The mean (median) residual return volatility 
is 0.002 (0.001).   
Existence of Local Block Holdings and Unclean Opinions
Prior research indicates that not all institutions have incentives 
to monitor management (Bushee 1998; Gaspar et al. 2005). As 
discussed earlier, I predict that local block institutional holders are 
better monitors than nonlocal institutional holders and thus firms 
with local block holdings are less likely to have unclean opinion 
than those with nonlocal block holdings or firms with no block 
holdings.
I report the probit regression results for equation (1) in Table 2. 
In the first column, I include a dummy for the existence of block 
institutional ownership and the controls. I find that the coefficient on 
the block holding dummy is insignificant, suggesting that the block 
institutional holding itself is not related to unclean opinions. In the 
second column, I include a dummy for local block holdings and a 
dummy for nonlocal block holdings. Consistent with the prediction, 
I find that the coefficient on local block holdings is a significant 
-0.16 (p-value<0.01) while that for nonlocal block holdings is insig-
nificant. This evidence is consistent with the beneficial effects of 
local block holder monitoring. This finding also confirms the view 
that institutional investors are not homogeneous. The coefficient 
estimates of the control variables are largely consistent with prior 
research.  
Existence of Local Block Holdings and Going-Concern Opinions
I also expect that the existence of local block holdings leads to a 
lower incidence of going-concern reports. Table 3 presents the probit 
regression results in equation (2). 
It is noteworthy that my sample size is much smaller for the 
analysis since I employ the data from Audit Analytics. The sample 
consists of 19,711 firm-years. However, I lose a few observations in 
the regressions due to data availability for the controls. As shown 
in the first column, I find that the coefficient on the block holding 
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Table 2. Probit Regressions of Unclean Opinions on Block Institutional 
Ownership and Control Variables 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable:






1 for block institutional ownership, 0 
otherwise
1 for local block institutional 
ownership, 0 otherwise 












Variance of the residual from the 

























































No. of observations 53,899 53,899
The table reports the probit regressions estimating the likelihood of unclean 
audit opinions. The sample consists of firm-years with institutional ownership 
from CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings for the period 1988-2005 for 
which the locations of firm and institution headquarters are available. Block 
institutional ownership is 1 if the firm has at least 5% of block institutional 
ownership, 0 otherwise. Local (nonlocal) block institutional ownership is 1 
if the firm has at least 5% of block equity holdings by institutional investors 
whose headquarters are located within the same (different) state as the firms’ 
headquarters. Audit opinions are obtained from Compustat Annual. Unclean 
audit opinion is an indicator variable, and is assigned the value of 0 for an 
unqualified opinion in year t and the value of 1 for any other opinion, includ-
ing qualified, adverse or unqualified with explanatory language. Book-to-
market and return on assets are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. To 
measure beta and variance of the residual from the market model, I estimate 
market model parameters by using days -220 to -20 relative to the earnings 
announcement date. I use as the market return the CRSP value-weighted re-
turn. p-values reported are two-tailed.
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Table 3. Probit Regressions of Going-Concern Opinions on Block 
Institutional Ownership and Control Variables 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable:







1 for block institutional ownership, 0 
otherwise  
1 for local block institutional 
ownership, 0 otherwise 






Total debt/ total assets
Operating income/total assets




Variance of the residual from the 

























































No. of observations 18,524 18,524
The table reports the probit regressions estimating the likelihood of going-con-
cern opinions. The sample consists of firm-years with institutional ownership 
from CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings for the period 1988-2005 for 
which the locations of firm and institution headquarters are available. Block 
institutional ownership is 1 if the firm has at least 5% of block institutional 
ownership, 0 otherwise. Local (nonlocal) block institutional ownership is 1 
if the firm has at least 5% of block equity holdings by institutional investors 
whose headquarters are located within the same (different) state as the firms’ 
headquarters. Going-concern opinions are extracted from Audit Analytics for 
the period of 2000-2005. Book-to-market and return on assets are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. To measure beta and variance of the residual 
from the market model, I estimate market model parameters by using days 
-220 to -20 relative to the earnings announcement date. I use as the market 
return the CRSP value-weighted return. p-values reported are two-tailed.
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Table 4. Probit Regressions of Auditor Changes on Block Institutional 
Ownership and Control Variables 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable:








1 for block institutional ownership, 0 
otherwise  
1 for local block institutional 
ownership, 0 otherwise 
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No. of observations 54,203 54,203
The table reports the probit regressions estimating the likelihood of auditor 
changes. The sample consists of firm-years with institutional ownership from 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings for the period 1988-2005 for which 
the locations of firm and institution headquarters are available. Block insti-
tutional ownership is 1 if the firm has at least 5% of block institutional own-
ership, 0 otherwise. Local (nonlocal) block institutional ownership is 1 if the 
firm has at least 5% of block equity holdings by institutional investors whose 
headquarters are located within the same (different) state as the firms’ head-
quarters. Auditors are obtained from Compustat Annual. Book-to-market and 
return on assets are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. To measure beta 
and variance of the residual from the market model, I estimate market model 
parameters by using days -220 to -20 relative to the earnings announcement 
date. I use as the market return the CRSP value-weighted return. p-values re-
ported are two-tailed.
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dummy is insignificant. In the second column, I decompose block 
holding ownership into local block holdings and nonlocal block 
holdings and report the results. Consistent with my prediction, 
my local block holding dummy is negatively associated with 
future going concern opinions (coefficient = -0.74, p-value <0.01), 
which suggests that the existence of local block holders achieve a 
reduction in the likelihood of going concern reports. However, I do 
not find such relation for nonlocal block holders. To the extent that 
going concern reports reflect lower quality financial statements, this 
result confirms the positive role of local institutional block holders 
in financial reporting quality. The above results so far suggest that 
local block holders who are informed investors play an important 
monitoring role in reducing the likelihood of unclean reports and 
going concern opinion. Below, I provide evidence about the effect of 
block holdings on auditor selection and audit payment decisions. 
That is, I examine the relation between the existence of local block 
holdings and audit quality by running regression models where 
auditor turnover and audit fees are the dependent variables. 
Existence of Local Block Holdings and Auditor Turnover
I identify auditor changes data from COMPUSTAT.9) Table 4 
displays the probit regression results for equation (3). In column (1), 
I do not find any significant relation between the existence of block 
ownership and auditor turnover (coefficient = -0.001, p-value = 0.97). 
To further examine this issue, I include both a local block holding 
dummy and a nonlocal block holding dummy and run a regression. 
In column (2), I observe a significantly negative coefficient on the 
local block holding dummy (coefficient = -0.13, p-value <0.01), 
whereas the coefficient on the nonlocal block holding dummy is in-
significant. 
In sum, there is strong evidence that firms with local block hold-
ings are less likely to change auditors in the future, consistent with 
prior research that local institutional investors have long investment 
horizons and play monitoring and governance roles (Kang and Kim 
2008). 
  9) In an unreported analysis, I also perform the analysis using the Audit Analytics 
data for audit turnover in a reduced sample and obtain qualitatively similar re-
sults.
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1 for block institutional ownership, 0 
otherwise  
1 for local block institutional 
ownership, 0 otherwise 
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No. of observations 17,729 17,729
The table reports the regressions of audit fees on block institutional owner-
ship and control variables. The sample consists of firm-years with institutional 
ownership from CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings for the period 
1988-2005 for which the locations of firm and institution headquarters are 
available. Block institutional ownership is 1 if the firm has at least 5% of block 
institutional ownership, 0 otherwise. Local (nonlocal) block institutional own-
ership is 1 if the firm has at least 5% of block equity holdings by institutional 
investors whose headquarters are located within the same (different) state as 
the firms’ headquarters. Audit fees are obtained from Audit Analytics for the 
period of 2000-2005. Book-to-market and return on assets are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. To measure beta and variance of the residual from 
the market model, I estimate market model parameters by using days -220 to 
-20 relative to the earnings announcement date. I use as the market return the 
CRSP value-weighted return. p-values reported are two-tailed.
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Existence of Local Block Holdings and Audit Fees
Table 5 reports the regression results for equation (4) where 
the dependant variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees. 
Interestingly, I do not find the relation between block holdings and 
audit fees systematically differs across firms with local block holders 
and those with nonlocal block holders. The result in column (1) 
shows that the coefficient on a block holding dummy is positive 
and statistically significant (p-value <0.10). The results are robust 
when I include a local block holding dummy and a nonlocal block 
holding dummy. The coefficients are both positive significant at the 
10% level as reported in column (2). One interpretation is that both 
local and nonlocal block holders demand high quality audits and in 
turn leads to higher audit fees. For example, Carcello et al. (2002) 
provide evidence that there is a positive relation between audit fees 
and board independence, diligence, and expertise, suggesting that 
the board of directors is likely to review and affect the overall audit 
scope and audit.
Additional Analyses
Prior studies suggest that stock ownership is a function of firm 
characteristics (e.g., Baik et al. 2010). Thus, my findings may not 
be able to distinguish between the following two possibilities. First, 
local block holders are good at selecting companies with good ac-
counting practice. Second, local block holders monitor management 
and thus play an important role in audit outcomes. Although I use 
lagged variables in the main analysis, I further address this issue 
by running the following regression model in the first stage and esti-
mate the regressions discussed in equations (1)-(4):
P LocalBlock Size BTM Pastreturn( )=1 = + + +β β β β0 1 2 3
+ + + +β β β β4 5 6 7Age ice Tunover R DPr &   (5)
+ + +β β ε8 9Re varturn Accruals
where Size is the natural logarithm of market cap, BTM is book-
to-market ratio, Past return is the preceding six-month return, 
Age is the number of months since a firm’s first appearance in 
COMPUSTAT, Turnover is the average monthly volume to number 
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of shares outstanding over the past six months, R&D is research 
and development expenses divided by total assets, Returnvar is the 
variance of the residual from the market model over the past one 
year, Accruals is the difference between income and operating cash 
flow, dividend by total assets. 
In unreported analysis, I find that my inferences are unchanged 
after controlling for the self-selection and endogeneity issues. In 
other words, I continue to find that the existence of local block 
ownership is negatively associated with the likelihood of unclean 
reports, going concern opinions, and auditor turnover. Also, I find a 
positive relation between the existence of local block ownership and 
audit fees. The results suggest that self-selection and endogeneity 
do not drive the results 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examine whether audit policy and outcomes sig-
nificantly differ between firms with local block holders and those 
with nonlocal block holders or those with no block holders. Since 
local investors are long-term investors and they tend to invest larger 
portion of their total investment in local companies, I expect that lo-
cal block holders can be dedicated investors who have strong incen-
tives to monitor management. Given that audit is about verifying ac-
counting information, informed investors, especially informed block 
holders who have strong incentives and abilities to monitor manage-
ment, can play an important role in audit process. 
Consistently, I find that companies with local block holders are 
less likely to have unclean/going-concern opinions, and more likely 
to have long-term relationships with auditors. Although I find weak 
evidence that the existence of local block investors affects audit fees, 
I do not observe any significant difference between firms with local 
block holdings and firms with nonlocal block holdings. Overall, this 
paper shows that informed local investors can have real effects on 
audit process through monitoring. 
Several caveats are in order. Although prior research suggests that 
local investors tend to hold their holdings for longer periods than 
nonlocal investors (Kang and Kim, 2008; Baik et al.  2010) and I find 
evidence that my key findings continue to hold when endogeneity 
issues are incorporated in the regression analysis, I acknowledge 
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that I do not completely rule out the possibility that my results 
reflect the aspects that local block holders tend to follow firms with 
good accounting quality. Second, I condition my analysis on the 
existence of institutional ownership on the SEC filing, which may 
potentially cover large firms only. Thus, it is important to note that 
my results may not generalize to all firms. Finally, audit opinions 
are related to only a few situations and thus may not differentiate 
audit quality for a broad set of firms. I am hoping that future 
research can shed light on these issues. 
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